8.26.2005

A Short History of War


is an online book from the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College which can be found here. it's a little lighter than I like, kinda overly summarized (only 5 paragraphs on the Byzantines, the coolest military in history?), but it goes all the way back to Sumeria, plus it has a lot of cool appendexis ... appendexii ...extra stuff like this two-part timeline covering 9997 B.C. to 2003 A.D.

8.25.2005

Del.icio.us


I just started a Del.icio.us page.

The link is right over there somewhere ------->

For those unfamilar with Del.icio.us, it's basically a site where you can add bookmarks for everyone to see. You put a link on your toolbar and any time you find an interesting page you click the link and are taken to your Del.icio.us page where you add keywords and click "save". You're then taken back to the original page. Pretty cool. It only takes a few seconds.
(Actually the link is right over there at the moment) --------->

I won't blog everything I link on Del.icio.us and won't link everything I blog. I will be adding links to very informative pages on a variety of subjects, such as the Clausewitz page I pointed to yesterday, plus a few news articles that are either groundbreaking or packed full of information, such as the article on the London Tube shootings and the LA Times article on Plame that I blogged in my last post. But I won't be linking everything I find mildly musing or interesting. In other words, the emphasis will generally be on good content. That and fart jokes.

The Plame Game


I have yet to read it but everyone is saying that this L.A. Times story is one of the best accounts of the Plame case so far. There isn't really any new information, but it is an extensive look at the timeline and all the little facts surrounding the case. I'm impressed just from skimming it.

Geez


PUCALLPA, Peru - Hundreds of scavengers combed through the wreckage of a Peruvian airliner Thursday, carrying away scrap metal, passengers' belongings and electronic equipment that could have offered clues into what caused the crash that left at least 37 dead.

Dozens of air force soldiers stood by and watched as residents of this Amazon jungle town dug through debris of the Boeing 737-200 that crashed Tuesday, looking for anything of value...

continued

8.24.2005

On Clausewitz


I was trying to find a quote I remember from Clausewitz's On War and stumbled upon this site which has several books online, including On War and a few indexes, a copy of an unknown edition of Vom Kriege if you prefer German, a Clausewitz essay called Principles of War and Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815­-1945.

Wow, I could spend weeks at this site.

I'm trying to accumulate as many ancient military texts as I can lay my electronic hands on and then post them here. I guess this is sort of like an early present on Christmas Eve. Enjoy.

8.23.2005

Was Atta's name datamined?


I was thinking about something in the NYT story yesterday.
The former contractor, James D. Smith, said that Mr. Atta's name and photograph were obtained through a private researcher in California who was paid to gather the information from contacts in the Middle East.
Whoa, hold the phones. According to Smith, Attas name wasn't found by sifting through information at all, it was found by asking around the neighborhood. Does that sound like datamining open source internet information to any of you? Not to me. It sounds more like good old fashioned human intelligence gathering, or HUMINT, was responsible for naming Atta, assuming Atta actually was named. I had thought yesterday's story was rather ho-hum, but isn't Smith contradicting everything we've heard so far?

8.22.2005

Able Danger double overtime


This story should be dead but it just keeps on ticking. It twists and turns like an Egyptian belly dancer but at the end of every day we never know anything more than we knew before. But what the hell, here's a recap of stuff that looks new but really contains no new information, just tidbits of explanations about the same thing we've been rehashing for two weeks.

The DoD can't seem to find anything to back up any claims about Atta.

Meanwhile, the two guys who actually say they saw Attas name have finally spoken about it. Phillpott, the man who testified to the 911 commission that he briefly saw Attas name on a chart in 2000, released a statement saying that doesn't want to talk about it but affirming that Atta had been identified in 2000.

We also finally get to hear from the unnamed civilian who Shaffer said knew of the Atta ID.
The former contractor, James D. Smith, said that Mr. Atta's name and photograph were obtained through a private researcher in California who was paid to gather the information from contacts in the Middle East. Mr. Smith said that he had retained a copy of the chart for some time and that it had been posted on his office wall at Andrews Air Force Base. He said it had become stuck to the wall and was impossible to remove when he switched jobs.
So Shaffer says the charts were destroyed, Weldon says he gave his last copy to National Security Advisor Steve Hadley (who refuses to comment) in 2001 (which looks like a lie), and Smith says he left the chart hanging on a wall at Andrews?

The only person who doesn't sound like a crank is Phillpott, but as Laura Rozen has pointed out all of these guys are in bed together working angles for funding of datamining projects. Shaffer actually said the reason this is a fuss is because they went to Weldon looking for funding support and Weldon thought it would be a good idea to make the fuss.

On the lighter side of Able Danger, Shaffer said in an interview with Michael Savage recently:
At one point in time, senior DOD officers compared my little unit called Able Danger to, you've probably seen the movie, Kelly's Heroes. They called them Shaffer's Heroes..."
Riiiiiight...

I give up caring about this story. What seemed like an earth-shattering story is now just a melee of rehashed accusations and everyone who is telling the tale is on a different page and all have an excuse as to why they can't prove what they're saying.

Put up or shut up.

There may be some truth to the Atta claim. I want to believe Phillpott, but knowing that there are money interests involved here plus a congresscritter with a reputation as a crank, it's asking a lot to care about something that can't be proven.

random links


Time for another installment of "blogs that have randomly sent people here via the blogger toolbar"

apvwheyseminar.blogspot.com
goisvivo.blogspot.com
mexicanpunkie.blogspot.com
responsiblegovernmentleague.blogspot.com
www.tvnewswatch.blogspot.com
lauypelao.blogspot.com
bballchica1209.blogspot.com
goisvivo.blogspot.com
theoreallyfactor.blogspot.com
www.iamcorona.com
imwaiting.blogspot.com
gaphriel.blogspot.com
babosatkat.blogspot.com
darktheconofman.blogspot.com
aaa-invitation-invitations-36ff5a.blogspot.com
runningnakedwithscissors.blogspot.com
carnivalkids.blogspot.com
pitabolas.blogspot.com
watsitagain.blogspot.com
happypictime.blogspot.com
www.rhigley.blogspot.com

8.21.2005

911 Commission statement on Able Danger


It's 10 days old but I got tired of reading it as a pdf file (I hate pdfs) and couldn't find it as plaintext anywhere so I converted it myself.

from here
August 12, 2005
Kean-Hamilton Statement on ABLE DANGER

Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, former Chair and Vice Chair of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission),in response to media inquiries about the Commission's investigation of the ABLE DANGER program, today released the following statement:

On October 21, 2003, Philip Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, two senior Commission staff members, and a representative of the executive branch, met at Bagram Base, Afghanistan, with three individuals doing intelligence work for the Department of Defense. One of the men, in recounting information about al Qaeda's activities in Afghanistan before 9/11, referred to a DOD program known as ABLE DANGER. He said this program was now closed, but urged Commission staff to get the files on this program and review them, as he thought the Commission would find information about al Qaeda and Bin Ladin that had been developed before the 9/11 attack. He also complained that Congress, particularly the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), had effectively ended a human intelligence network he considered valuable.

As with their other meetings, Commission staff promptly prepared a memorandum for the record. That memorandum, prepared at the time, does not record any mention of Mohamed Atta or any of the other future hijackers, or any suggestion that their identities were known to anyone at DOD before 9/11. Nor do any of the three Commission staffers who participated in the interview, or the executive branch lawyer, recall hearing any such allegation.

While still in Afghanistan, Dr. Zelikow called back to the Commission headquarters in Washington and requested that staff immediately draft a document request seeking information from DOD on ABLE DANGER. The staff had also heard about ABLE DANGER in another context, related to broader military planning involving possible operations against al Qaeda before 9/11.

1

In November 2003, shortly after the staff delegation had returned to the United States, two document requests related to ABLE DANGER were finalized and sent to DOD. One, sent on November 6, asked, among other things, for any planning order or analogous documents about military operations related to al Qaeda and Afghanistan issued from the beginning of 1998 to September 20, 2001, and any reports, memoranda, or briefings by or for either the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Commanding General of the U.S. Special Operations Command in connection with such planning, specifically including material related to ABLE DANGER. The other, sent on November 25, treated ABLE DANGER as a possible intelligence program and asked for all documents and files associated with "DIA's program `ABLE DANGER'" from the beginning of 1998 through September 20, 2001.

In February 2004, DOD provided documents responding to these requests. Some were turned over to the Commission and remain in Commission files. Others were available for staff review in a DOD reading room. Commission staff reviewed the documents. Four former staff members have again, this week, reviewed those documents turned over to the Commission, which are held in the Commission's archived files. Staff who reviewed the documents held in the DOD reading room made notes summarizing each of them. Those notes are also in the Commission archives and have also been reviewed this week.

The records discuss a set of plans, beginning in 1999, for ABLE DANGER, which involved expanding knowledge about the al Qaeda network. Some documents include diagrams of terrorist networks. None of the documents turned over to the Commission mention Mohamed Atta or any of the other future hijackers. Nor do any of the staff notes on documents reviewed in the DOD reading room indicate that Mohamed Atta or any of the other future hijackers were mentioned in any of those documents.

A senior staff member also made verbal inquiries to the HPSCI and CIA staff for any information regarding the ABLE DANGER operation. Neither organization produced any documents about the operation, or displayed any knowledge of it.

In 2004, Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA) and his staff contacted the Commission to call the Commission's attention to the Congressman's critique of the U.S. intelligence community. No mention was made in these conversations of a claim that Mohamed Atta or any of the other future hijackers had been identified by DOD employees before 9/11.

2

In early July 2004, the Commission's point of contact at DOD called the Commission's attention to the existence of a U.S. Navy officer employed at DOD who was seeking to be interviewed by Commission staff in connection with a data mining project on which he had worked. The DOD point of contact indicated that the prospective witness was claiming that the project had linked Atta to an al Qaeda cell located in New York in the 1999-2000 time frame. Shortly after receiving this information, the Commission staff's front office assigned two staff members with knowledge of the 9/11 plot and the ABLE DANGER operation to interview the witness at one of the Commission's Washington, D.C. offices.

On July 12, 2004, as the drafting and editing process for the Report was coming to an end (the Report was released on July 22, and editing continued to occur through July 17), a senior staff member, Dieter Snell, accompanied by another staff member, met with the officer at one of the Commission's Washington, D.C. offices. A representative of the DOD also attended the interview.

According to the memorandum for the record on this meeting, prepared the next day by Mr. Snell, the officer said that ABLE DANGER included work on "link analysis," mapping links among various people involved in terrorist networks. According to this record, the officer recalled seeing the name and photo of Mohamed Atta on an "analyst notebook chart" assembled by another officer (who he said had retired and was now working as a DOD contractor).

The officer being interviewed said he saw this material only briefly, that the relevant material dated from February through April 2000, and that it showed Mohamed Atta to be a member of an al Qaeda cell located in Brooklyn. The officer complained that this information and information about other alleged members of a Brooklyn cell had been soon afterward deleted from the document ("redacted") because DOD lawyers were concerned about the propriety of DOD intelligence efforts that might be focused inside the United States. The officer referred to these as "posse comitatus" restrictions. Believing the law was being wrongly interpreted, he said he had complained about these restrictions up his chain of command in the U.S. Special Operations Command, to no avail.

The officer then described the remainder of his work on link analysis efforts, until he was eventually transferred to other work. The officer complained about how these methods were being used by the Defense Intelligence Agency, and mentioned other concerns about U.S. officials and foreign governments.

3

At the time of the officer's interview, the Commission knew that, according to travel and immigration records, Atta first obtained a U.S. visa on May 18, 2000, and first arrived in the United States (at Newark) on June 3, 2000. Atta joined up with Marwan al-Shehhi. They spent little time in the New York area, traveling later in June to Oklahoma and then to Florida, where they were enrolled in flight school by early July.

The interviewee had no documentary evidence and said he had only seen the document briefly some years earlier. He could not describe what information had led to this supposed Atta identification. Nor could the interviewee recall, when questioned, any details about how he thought a link to Atta could have been made by this DOD program in 2000 or any time before 9/11. The Department of Defense documents had mentioned nothing about Atta, nor had anyone come forward between September 2001 and July 2004 with any similar information. Weighing this with the information about Atta's actual activities, the negligible information available about Atta to other U.S. government agencies and the German government before 9/11, and the interviewer's assessment of the interviewee's knowledge and credibility, the Commission staff concluded that the officer's account was not sufficiently reliable to warrant revision of the report or further investigation.

We have seen press accounts alleging that a DOD link analysis had tied Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi (who had arrived in the U.S. shortly before Atta on May 29) to two other future hijackers, Hazmi al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, in 1999-2000. No such claim was made to the Commission by any witness. Moreover, all evidence that was available to the Commission indicates that Hazmi and Mihdhar were never on the East coast until 2001 and that these two pairs of future hijackers had no direct contact with each other until June 2001.

The Commission did not mention ABLE DANGER in its report. The name and character of this classified operation had not, at that time, been publicly disclosed. The operation itself did not turn out to be historically significant, set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts that involved Bin Ladin and al Qaeda. The Report's description of military planning against al Qaeda prior to 9/11 encompassed this and other military plans. The information we received about this program also contributed to the Commission's depiction of intelligence efforts against al Qaeda before 9/11.

# # #

4

Image gallery script


Here's a quick script I just wrote that will make an HTML page called "gallery.htm" that shows all images in a directory. Nothing fancy, but it does exactly what I want it to do. Maybe someone out there will find a use for it too
#! /bin/sh
dir=`pwd`
touch gallery.htm
echo '<html>' >> gallery.htm
echo '<head>' >> gallery.htm
echo '<title>'$dir Image Gallery'</title>' >> gallery.htm
echo '</head>' >> gallery.htm
echo '<body>' >> gallery.htm

echo "Gimme a title"
read title
echo '<center><H1>'$title'</H1></center>' >> gallery.htm
echo '<br>' >> gallery.htm
echo '<br>' >> gallery.htm


for filename in *.jpg
do
echo '<center>''<img width=785 height=589 src="'"$filename"\"\>'</center>' >> gallery.htm
echo '<br>' >> gallery.htm
echo '<br>' >> gallery.htm
echo '<br>' >> gallery.htm
done

echo '</html>' >> gallery.htm
echo '</body>' >> gallery.htm

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